Swords to Plowshares, Inc.
Case Narrative
Depleted Uranium (DU) Exposures

Author: Dan Fahey
Thank You
Executive Summary
Key Findings
Recommendations
Background
Exposure Scenarios
Selected Documents
Bibliography
Author's Personal Statement

Thank You

Thank you to all those who provided significant information, guidance, and support including Doug Rokke, Charles Sheehan-Miles, Chris Kornkven, Paul Sullivan, Michael and Shawna Stacy, Wade White, Victor Suell, Vern Troop, Larry McNamara, Michael Flores, Cassandra Garner, Duane Mowrer, Debbie Judd, John Humphries, Jerry Wheat, Mark Panzera, Daniel Braun, Kenny Rogers, The National Gulf War Resource Center, Veterans for Peace, the Veterans Speakers Alliance,

Bill Motto Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 5888, Vietnam Veterans of America, Anthony Guarisco, The Alliance of Atomic Veterans, Elinor Roberts, Michael Blecker, Cissy Dendy, David Ewing, Steve Brooks, Leonard Dietz, Rosalie Bertell, Kathy Lemar,

Dolly Lymburner, Tara Thornton, The Depleted Uranium Citizens' Network of the Military Toxics Project, the staff and volunteers at the Military Toxics Project, EJ Hogendoorn, Human Rights Watch, Kathleen Kerr, Scott Vanderheyden, Veterans Family Health Services, Oz and Beth Grimes, Dr. Harry Pepper, Chris Fillio, Sherri Brenner, Dave Parks, Denny Williams, Rod Hafemeister, Arthur Brice, Bill Mesler, KPFA Radio in Berkeley, California, Anthony Duff, the Gulf Veterans Association (UK), Kathleen Sullivan, Dennis Flaherty, Trauma After Care Trust (UK), Henk van der Keur, LAKA Foundation (Netherlands), The Edge Gallery (UK), Matt Puglisi, The American Legion, The Veterans of Foreign Wars, Elissa Gershon, Victor Sylvester, the Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Association, Erika Lundholm, Grace Portori, Rural Alliance for Military Accountability, Laura Olah, Damacio Lopez, Judy Scotnicki, John Paul-Hasko, and Paul Cox.

Special thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, the Internet, the United States Army, the United States Air Force, the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illness, Bernard Rostker, the Depleted Uranium Program at the Baltimore, MD VAMC, and the British Ministry of Defense for the documentation and access to information they provided.

This report could not have been published without the generous assistance of Rosemary Fahey, Michael Fahey, Swords to Plowshares, the Military Toxics Project, Bill and June Thompson, Paul Cox and Margo Schueler, Ted Sobocinski, Marilyn White, Barbara Sonneborn Greenberg, O.G. and Elizabeth Grimes, Ruth Baldino, Dr. Robert Olson, Gordon Smith, Michael Job, Rebecca Bernhard, Mark Kiselicka, Gerald and Ellen Nicosia, Cassandra Garner, William Rothman, James Janko, Paul Gallagher, Grace Steiner, Edwin Hart, Louise Weiss, Veterans for Peace Chapter 71, Fred Ptucha, Veterans for Peace Chapter 69, Veterans Speakers Alliance, Clark Smith, Carol Wilder, and Bill Motto Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 5888.

Executive Summary

Responding to requests from veterans and their families, Swords to Plowshares, the National Gulf War Resource Center, and the Military Toxics Project conducted an in-depth investigation of Persian Gulf War exposures to depleted uranium fired from US tanks and aircraft. For this, our first Case Narrative, we have found it useful to adopt the Case Narrative methodology and format used by the US Department of Defense.

This methodology required us to review all available information, and make an assessment based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that depleted uranium exposures did or did not take place?

Our investigation leads us to conclude that the United StatesDepartment of Defense (DoD) has engaged in a deliberate attempt to avoid responsibility for consciously allowing the widespread exposure of hundreds of thousands of United States and coalition servicemen and women to more than 630,000 pounds of depleted uranium released by US tanks and aircraft during the Persian Gulf War. The Department of Defense's actions regarding depleted uranium exposures have been characterized by a blatant disregard for existing laws and regulations, human rights, and common sense. The Pentagon's desire to ensure the future use of depleted uranium ammunition has taken precedence over the need to protect American troops from exposure to depleted uranium and the requirement to provide medical care to servicemen and women who have developed serious health problems due to their exposure to depleted uranium.

Until January, 1998, the Department of Defense denied that more than a few dozen veterans were exposed to depleted uranium during Operation Desert Storm. On January 8, 1998, DoD made the `watershed' acknowledgment that exposures to chemically toxic and radioactive depleted uranium were widespread during the Gulf War. However, the US Department of Defense and UK Ministry of Defense have now fallen back to their next standard line of defense: `no one is sick from their exposure to depleted uranium. The current positions of the US Department of Defense and the UK Ministry of Defense with respect to DU exposures can be summed up as `They climbed on contaminated equipment, but they didn't inhale.'

Since 1991, the course of research, investigation, and medical care for veterans exposed to depleted uranium has been side-tracked by the deliberate efforts of the Pentagon to downplay both the scope and severity of Persian Gulf War depleted uranium exposures. As a result, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) failed in its duty to provide medical care and assistance to Persian Gulf War veterans with health problems known or suspected to be related to depleted uranium exposure. In addition, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses and other federal investigations have mistakenly accepted Pentagon assertions downplaying the extent and significance of Gulf War depleted uranium exposures.

The potential for health problems resulting from widespread battlefield exposures to depleted uranium is predicted in US military reports dating back to 1974.

Yet, for reasons not adequately explained by the Department of Defense, basic information about depleted uranium was never shared with the vast majority of men and women in the Persian Gulf region prior to, during, or after Operation Desert Storm. Military officials disregarded common sense and existing Army and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations by failing to inform military personnel about the use of depleted uranium ammunition, failing to instruct them about the need for safety measures and protective clothing during operations in depleted uranium- contaminated areas, and failing to provide medical testing and care to all men and women who had known or suspected exposure to depleted uranium.

We are concerned that the Department of Defense has still not implemented a depleted uranium training program completed in 1995. The expanded use of depleted uranium ammunition in the US arsenal combined with the international proliferation of depleted uranium penetrators since Operation Desert Storm highlights the urgent need for immediate depleted uranium training for all US military personnel.

Our investigation leads us to conclude that the most likely method of exposure to depleted uranium in the Persian Gulf War was through the inhalation and ingestion of depleted uranium dust created during penetrator impacts or fires. Therefore, we are deeply concerned that there are no federal research projects underway or planned on the relationship between inhalation or ingestion of depleted uranium dust and the health problems affecting Gulf War veterans and their families. We discovered that only two out of the three current research projects on the effects of imbedded depleted uranium metal are publicly acknowledged by the VA and DoD. The VA's Depleted Uranium Program, which was specifically designed by military officials to use Gulf War veterans as human research subjects on the effects of depleted uranium, is noticeably absent from the list of officially acknowledged federal research on Gulf War veterans' health problems.

Our investigation leads us to conclude that the efforts of the Department of Defense on Gulf War depleted uranium exposures are irreparably flawed. The January, 1998 `watershed' admission by the Pentagon that thousands of veterans were unnecessarily exposed to depleted uranium has done little to dispel our lack of faith in the Pentagon's misguided efforts.

In contrast, we are encouraged to report that the VA's Depleted Uranium Program has started to question the information provided to it by the Pentagon, and is planning to expand its medical coverage of veterans exposed to depleted uranium.

We conclude that the US Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs and the UK Ministry of Defense are incapable of honestly investigating the relationship between depleted uranium exposures and the health problems affecting more than 100,000 Gulf War veterans and their families. Therefore, we agree with the November, 1997 findings of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight that "responsibility for Gulf War illnesses, especially the research agenda, must be placed in a more responsive agency, independent of the DoD and the VA."

Key Findings

1. During Operation Desert Storm, US aircraft and US and British tanks shot approximately 630,000 pounds of armor-piercing depleted uranium penetrators. This release created large amounts of depleted uranium dust which contaminated thousands of impacted vehicles and the areas around them.

2. In 1980, the National Lead Plant in Colonie, NY was shut down by the State of New York for releasing an amount of depleted uranium dust into the air around Albany, NY that was approximately 700,000 times less than the amount of depleted uranium released during Operation Desert Storm. The National Lead Plant manufactured depleted uranium penetrators for the Department of Defense.

3. US military commanders failed in their duty to protect US and coalition forces from exposures to depleted uranium before, during, and after Operation Desert Storm.

4. Based on the available information, at least 400,000 Gulf War veterans may have inhaled, ingested, or incurred wound contamination by depleted uranium dust during combat operations, equipment recovery operations, and post-war `battlefield tours.'

5. Since Operation Desert Storm, the Department of Defense has intentionally understated the number of veterans it knows were exposed to depleted uranium in friendly fire incidents, during recovery operations, as a result of the July, 1991 Doha, Kuwait munitions fire, and through contact with contaminated areas and equipment.

6. After Operation Desert Storm, hundreds of thousands of veterans who had known or suspected exposures to depleted uranium were not provided with the medical testing and follow-up mandated by existing US Army and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations.

7. The US Army Surgeon General's Office intentionally misinformed the VA's Depleted Uranium Program about the number of veterans requiring medical care due to their exposure to depleted uranium in friendly fire incidents.

8. The Department of Veterans Affairs has used and continues to use inaccurate testing methods to screen Gulf War veterans for depleted uranium exposure.

9. The Department of Veterans Affairs has denied medical care through the Depleted Uranium Program to the hundreds of thousands of veterans potentially exposed to depleted uranium because of its unquestioning acceptance of erroneous information provided by the Department of Defense.

10. Many Gulf War veterans and their families are currently exhibiting symptoms of depleted uranium poisoning, including kidney and liver problems, immune system dysfunction, and reproductive problems. The long-term health effects of depleted uranium, including cancers, may not have fully manifested in exposed veterans and civilians at this time.

11. Numerous federal investigations of Gulf War veterans' illnesses, including the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, ignored evidence of widespread depleted uranium exposures in the Persian Gulf War.

12. The failure by the Department of Defense to train military personnel about depleted uranium puts men and women unnecessarily at risk in the event of the accidental or intentional release of depleted uranium from munitions. Particularly at risk are personnel in combat units in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and Korea.

13. The presence of depleted uranium contamination in areas of Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bosnia, and the United States poses a long term threat to the health of local populations and US military forces who live, work, and travel through those lands.

14. The proliferation of depleted uranium weapons threatens to contaminate large areas of land in future conflicts and adversely impact the health of military personnel and civilian populations in countries around the world.

15. Current US Army guidelines requiring units operating in depleted uranium contaminated areas to have proper training, radiation detection equipment, and medical testing could in theory prevent US troops from conducting combat operations in Kuwait or Iraq should the current crisis evolve into ground combat.

Recommendations

1. The United States Congress should immediately investigate whether US forces currently deployed in the Persian Gulf region have been trained about depleted uranium safety measures, issued appropriate protective equipment, and provided with radiacmeters to detect depleted uranium contamination. In addition, Congress should investigate whether the US military medical command is prepared to test all veterans with known or suspected exposures to depleted uranium, as called for in Army Regulation 40-5.

2. A non-governmental organization or agency with no ties to the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Veterans Affairs should be tasked and funded by Congress to conduct a thorough investigation of all Persian Gulf War hazardous exposures, including depleted uranium. This investigation should review and make recommendations on research on the health effects of depleted uranium, and current or planned anti-armor alternatives to depleted uranium penetrators.

3. All Gulf War veterans who were exposed to depleted uranium contaminated areas and equipment should receive letters confirming their exposure from the Department of Defense, similar to the letters provided to members of the 144th New Jersey National Guard Service and Supply Company. This `Confirmation of Depleted Uranium Exposure' letter should be provided to anyone present in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations from August, 1990 to today.

4. All Gulf War veterans, their families, and civilians who have known or suspected exposures to depleted uranium should be automatically provided with medical care and disability benefits if they develop the known health effects of internal or external exposure to depleted uranium.

5. An independent body of experts with no ties to the Departments of Defense, Energy, or Veterans Affairs should review the protocol for the Depleted Uranium Program, including the current use of 24-hour urine tests to screen veterans for their 1991 exposure to depleted uranium.

6. The Department of Defense should immediately begin training all military personnel, regardless of occupational specialty, about the use of depleted uranium munitions and safety procedures required during contact with contaminated personnel or equipment.

7. An international organization should investigate and identify all nations possessing, developing, testing, selling, or using depleted uranium munitions, and all known locations of depleted uranium contamination.

8. An organization or agency with no ties to the US Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Energy, and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, should undertake a cost benefit analysis for depleted uranium munitions. This investigation should compare the necessity for depleted uranium penetrators against the availability of alternative anti-armor weapons systems, the costs of testing all military personnel potentially exposed to depleted uranium in future conflicts, the costs of long-term medical care and disability benefits for people exposed to depleted uranium, the effect on battle readiness posed by the need for military personnel to wear protective suits and masks in depleted uranium-contaminated areas, and the costs of cleaning up depleted uranium-contaminated environments and equipment.

9. An independent, international organization should investigate the health situation in Kuwait and Iraq and analyze the connection between health problems in those countries and the health problems affecting more than 100,000 Gulf War veterans and their families. Such an analysis should include a comprehensive radiological survey and risk assessment for Gulf War battlefields, which has up until now not been conducted.

10. In a demonstration of true leadership and vision, the United States of America should lead an international effort to ban the production, stockpiling, testing, sale, and use of depleted uranium penetrators.

Part I: Background on Depleted Uranium Munitions

Uranium is a naturally occurring heavy metal that is extracted from the earth through mining. After uranium ore is removed from the earth, it may undergo a process called uranium enrichment. During uranium enrichment, a small amount of the highly radioactive U-235 isotope is extracted from uranium ore for use in nuclear weapons and reactors. The waste by-product of the enrichment process is called `depleted' uranium. Depleted uranium is about 60% as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium, and has a half-life of 4.5 billion years.

Both naturally occurring uranium and `depleted' uranium are comprised of over 99% of the U-238 isotope (see Table 1).

A 1995 report on depleted uranium munitions completed by the Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) notes that "DU is a low- level radioactive waste, and, therefore, must be disposed in a licensed repository." As a result of more than fifty years of uranium enrichment, the US Department of Energy currently maintains a stockpile in excess of 1.1 billion pounds (505 thousand metric tons) of depleted uranium waste material.


Table 1. Isotope Contents of Uranium and Depleted Uranium Isotope
Uranium

Depleted Uranium

U-23400.0057%00.001%
U-235 00.72%00.2%
U-238 99.28%99.8%

Depleted Uranium in Weapons Systems

In the 1960's, the US Army became interested in using depleted uranium in weapons systems because it is extremely dense, pyrophoric (capable of spontaneously igniting), and cheaply available in huge quantities. While depleted uranium is used as a catalyst in certain mines, as a `blanket' around nuclear warheads to enhance the yield of thermonuclear weapons, and as a counter-weight in certain missiles and aircraft, this case narrative will focus on the use of depleted uranium in kinetic energy penetrators and tank armor.

Kinetic energy penetrators are dense metal rods which can pierce armor when fired at a high velocity. Depleted uranium and tungsten are the two heavy metals most suitable for use as kinetic energy penetrators. Depleted uranium is available in larger quantities and at a cheaper price than tungsten, and DU also slightly outperforms tungsten alloy in armor penetration. Depleted uranium, however, is radioactive and much more chemically toxic than tungsten. Both depleted uranium and tungsten alloy penetrators are used in the US arsenal, and the arsenals of armed forces around the world.

The July, 1990 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) report Kinetic Energy Penetrator Environmental and Health Considerations, compared the merits and drawbacks of depleted uranium and tungsten kinetic energy penetrators.

The SAIC report states:

While much more is known about the health effects of uranium than of tungsten alloys, the comparable information on chemical toxicity indicates that insoluble DU is approximately 25 times more toxic than insoluble tungsten and soluble DU is 20 times more toxic than soluble tungsten when exposure is at the limits allowed by the regulations.

The significantly greater toxicity of depleted uranium prompted SAIC to note: "cleanup requirements on ranges and the battle-field, as well as combat exposures to soldiers, appear to favor tungsten, although these issues remain unsettled as discussed elsewhere in this report." SAIC recommended "a long-term ballistic enhancement effort for tungsten . . . which considers penetrator/target interactions and attempts to determine appropriate material engineering to promote improved terminal ballistics."


Table 2. Selected Depleted Uranium Penetrators in the US Arsenal, 1998 (See a more detailed list in Tab B)

Ammunition Type

Weapons System

DU Penetrator Weight (pounds)

M829A2, Armor Piercing Fin, Stabilized Discarding, Sabot with Tracer, (APFSDS-T), (120mm)

M1 A1, M1A2Tanks

10.5

M900, (APFSDS-T), (105mm)

M1, M60A3 Tanks

8.5

PGU-14, Armor-Piercing, Incendiary (API), (30mm)

A-10 Aircraft

0.67

M919 (APDS-T) (25mm)

M2, M3 BradleyVehicle

0.2

PGU/20, (API) ,(25mm)

AV-8B Harrier Aircraft ,Light AmphibiousVehicles (LAV)

0.33

MK-149-2 , (20mm)

Phalanx CIWS ,missile defense gun

0.15


One major disadvantage to tungsten from a US military perspective is that the US currently imports approximately 50 percent of its tungsten supply from China, an uncertain ally in time of conflict. The slight advantage of DU over tungsten alloy in armor penetration and the large stockpile of DU waste material within the US are the two main reasons that the US military has chosen to make its kinetic energy penetrators out of depleted uranium.

The depleted uranium kinetic energy penetrators used by the US military do not explode; they fragment and burn through armor "due to the pyrophoric nature of uranium metal and the extreme flash temperatures generated on impact." Depleted uranium penetrators are fired by a growing number of weapons systems within the US arsenal (see Table 2). The Russians recently introduced an armor piercing high explosive round with a shaped charge liner made of depleted uranium, to enhance armor penetration.

Depleted uranium is also used to reinforce the armor protection of M1 series tanks. When used as an armor package, DU is inserted into a "sleeve" in the regular steel armor of a tank, then welded shut. The DU armor package on M1 series tanks is called Abrams Heavy Armor, or AHA. Tank turrets containing AHA packages are marked by a "U" (for uranium) stamped or welded near the right side grenade launcher as part of the turret serial number.

Behavior of Depleted Uranium Munitions during Battlefield Conditions. When a depleted uranium penetrator impacts a target, or a tank with DU armor or DU rounds are consumed in a fire, some of the depleted uranium will burn and oxidize into small particles. Depleted uranium penetrators which miss their target may come to rest on the soil surface, or become buried in the earth or submerged in water. These spent penetrators will oxidize over time, breaking down into uranium dust. The oxidation of a bare penetrator will occur most rapidly in water or a wet environment. The size of the uranium particles created, the ease with which they may be inhaled or ingested, and their ability to move through the air, the earth, the water, or a persons body depends upon the manner in which the depleted uranium metal became dust.

US Army test data has shown that when a depleted uranium penetrator impacts a target, between 20 and 70 percent of the penetrator rod will burn and oxidize into small particles.

This means that between 2 and 7 pounds of highly toxic and radioactive uranium dust is created from the impact of one 120mm depleted uranium penetrator with an armored target. A tank impacted by three depleted uranium penetrators -- and the area around it -- could be contaminated with between 6 and 21 pounds of uranium dust. Uranium dust from an initial impact could be resuspended by subsequent impacts of DU rounds. Test-firing and combat studies have shown that most of the DU dust created upon impact comes to rest within 50 meters of the target.

A March 8, 1991 memorandum sent to units in the Persian Gulf region by the US Army Armament, Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) summarized four pre-war Army reports which studied the DU particles created by impacts: "The DU oxide aerosol formed during the impact of DU into armor has a high percentage of respirable size particles (50 to 96%), and an appreciable percentage of those respirable particles are readily soluble in lung fluids (17 to 48%)."

As noted by ARDEC, between 50 and 96% of the uranium dust created by an impact will be of respirable size. Respirable size particles are less than 0.0004 inch in diameter. By comparison, a typical grain of sand is approximately 0.04 inch in diameter -- or 100 times larger than the majority of the uranium dust particles created by a penetrator impact. Because of their microscopic size, respirable size particles may easily enter the body via inhalation, ingestion, or wound contamination.

The solubility of the uranium particles determines the rate at which the uranium moves from the site of internalization [lung for inhalation, gastrointestinal (GI) tract for ingestion, or theinjury site for wound contamination and injection], into the blood stream and then to the organs. As noted in the March 8, 1991 ARDEC memorandum, between 52 and 83% of the uranium dust particles created by an impact are insoluble, meaning that if they enter the body, they are not readily excreted. The soluble uranium particles will travel in the blood stream, with some being excreted in the urine and feces and the remainder primarily depositing in the kidneys, liver, and bones. Soluble uranium compounds may also be passed from an exposed mother to an unborn child through the placenta, or to a baby through the mother's milk.

A US Army Chemical School training manual on DU munitions, Development of Depleted Uranium Training Support Packages:

Tier I - General Audience Final Lesson Plan (hereafter referred to as the DU training manual), completed in October, 1995 notes that:

The person most likely to be contaminated is breathing without protection when DU munitions hit and penetrate his AHA M1 tank and the DU aerosolize into the tank turret. He will inhale large amounts of DU dust. Next is the person in an AHA M1 tank hit and penetrated by non-DU munitions. The DU in the armor would aerosolize into the turret. Other persons include crew members in Bradleys struck by DU ammunition. Last are individuals moving in, on, or near such vehicles after such an incident. Soldiers involved in these incidents should be considered contaminated.

Other personnel who may be contaminated by uranium dust include rescue, medical, and recovery teams, and personnel who inhale airborne DU dust in the smoke from burning DU-contaminated vehicles. Personnel inside bunkers or buildings which are penetrated by DU rounds, and those who subsequently come in contact with these areas, could also inhale or ingest uranium dust.

Some of the dust created during the impact of a DU penetrator becomes airborne and is scattered in the area around the impacted vehicle. The 1995 Army DU training manual warns soldiers that:

You may breathe or otherwise ingest DU particles suspended in the air. They may come to rest on a surface and remain there. They may come to rest on a surface, like your hand, and you may ingest or inhale them. They may come to rest on an open wound.

Even after these uranium particles come to rest, "vehicles or personnel may stir up the particles that settle by moving through the contaminated area. The particles may move a short distance. They may be inhaled or ingested."

The potential for large amounts of uranium dust to be created when DU munitions are used in combat was noted in a July, 1990 report on the health and environmental effects of depleted uranium penetrators completed for the US Army by the Science Applications International Corporations (SAIC). The SAIC report remarked that "under combat conditions, the MEI's [most exposed individuals] are probably the ground troops that re-enter a battlefield following the exchange of armor-piercing munitions, either on foot or on motorized transports."

The SAIC report indicates that before the buildup in the Persian Gulf even began, the Army had a working definition of which servicemen and women would most likely to be exposed to depleted uranium contamination following the use of DU penetrators in combat.

Fires involving DU rounds or armor may also produce significant amounts of uranium dust. In severe fire conditions, DU penetrators will "slow cook" and completely oxidize into powder. Up to 10.7 pounds of uranium dust could therefore be created for each 120mm DU penetrator that is consumed in a fire. The temperature of the fire determines the size of the depleted uranium dust aerosols created.

Based on a review of three Army reports on DU-munitions fires, the March, 1991 ARDEC memorandum reported that the following characteristics summarize DU oxides formed during these fires:

Small percentage of respirable-size dust particles (0.07% to 0.6%); those respirable-size particles that are formed are essentially very insoluble in lung fluids and, therefore, if inhaled, pose primarily a radiological, as opposed to a chemical, toxicological hazard. This translates into upwards of 25 grams (<1 ounce) of DU particulates in respirable size being formed in a fire during the heating of an average DU penetrator tank munition.

Though an entire DU penetrator could be reduced to dust in a fire, only a small amount of this dust may be microscopic in size. This uranium dust, like the uranium dust created by the impact of a DU round, could contaminate wounds or be ingested "via food intake, cigarette smoking, etc., prior to a person washing his hands and face." Army Technical Bulletin TB 9-1300- 278 notes that "special attention must be given to the areas between the fingers and around the nails. The outer edges of the hands are readily contaminated, and must not be neglected in the washing."

Depleted uranium oxides formed by an impact or a fire may become airborne. These uranium dust particles may be carried by the wind for miles before falling to the ground. The ability of DU dust to travel long distances in the air was documented in 1979, when a total of sixteen air filters at three different locations of the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) in Schenectady, NY were found to contain DU dust. The source of the DU particles proved to be the National Lead Industries plant in Colonie, NY, which manufactured 30mm DU rounds and DU counterweights for the Air Force.

Three of the sixteen air filters which contained DU particles were located 26 miles from the National Lead plant.

Unrelated to the discovery of DU in KAPL air filters, in February, 1980, a court order by the State of New York forced National Lead to cease production of DU munitions because they regularly exceeded a NY State radioactivity limit of 150 microcuries for airborne emissions in a given month. The 150 microcuries corresponds to a monthly release of 0.85 pounds of uranium dust. By comparison, the amount of depleted uranium released in January and February, 1991 in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq was more than 700,000 times greater than the amount that shut down the National Lead plant. The National Lead plant closed in 1983 and is now being decontaminated and dismantled.

Depleted uranium dust and penetrators deposited in the soil may contaminate food or water supplies. The corrosion rate for a DU penetrator in soil depends upon the chemical makeup of the soil and other environmental conditions. Weathered DU penetrators principally corrode into uranium dust that is very soluble in water. The US Army Chemical School DU training manual notes that:

DU's mobility in water is due to how easily it dissolves. Soluble compounds of DU will readily dissolve and migrate with surface or ground water. Drinking or washing or other contact with contaminated water will spread the contamination . . . The end result of air and water contamination is that DU is deposited in the soil. Once in the soil, it stays there unless moved. This means that the area remains contaminated, and will not decontaminate itself.

The only effective way to decontaminate an area is to remove DU fragments and the top layer of soil and dispose of these materials in a radioactive waste repository.

One example of depleted uranium's ability to contaminate soil and water is found at the Starmet (formerly Nuclear Metals, Inc.) plant in Concord, Massachusetts. During the manufacture of DU penetrators for the military, uranium dust contaminated the area around the plant and found its way into the groundwater. In October, 1997, a $6.5 million cleanup of DU contamination at Starmet began which will remove approximately 6,000 cubic yards of sludge and soil containing high levels of depleted uranium to a low-level radioactive waste disposal site in Clive, Utah. During the site preparation phase, "air monitors near Starmet detected very low levels of uranium in the atmosphere." Additionally, "test wells (near the plant) have detected higher than expected levels of uranium."

Airborne depleted uranium and depleted uranium deposited in the soil or water may have an impact on the natural environment. Animals may inhale DU dust, drink DU-contaminated water, ingest vegetation or other DU-contaminated animals, or incidentally ingest DU during preening. Depleted uranium dust may come to rest on plants, and could accumulate in certain plants through root uptake. An ongoing study at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is examining multiple exposure pathways, including DU accumulation in soil and plants, livestock drinking contaminated water, human consumption of contaminated water, human consumption of contaminated meat and milk, soil ingestion, dust inhalation, and external exposure to DU particulates.

A review of Army test data on depleted uranium penetrator impacts indicates that several pounds of uranium dust may be created each time a DU tank penetrator impacts a target. Most of the uranium dust particles created by an impact will be 100 times smaller than a grain of sand. Army test data also shows that depleted uranium penetrators may completely oxidize to dust during a fire. Army test data and the experience of DU manufacturing plants in the US demonstrates that uranium particles may be carried downwind for miles, and may migrate in the soil and contaminate water supplies. In summary, the use of depleted uranium munitions and tank armor in combat can reasonably be expected to create large amounts of microscopic uranium dust particles which may contaminate water sources and soil, and may enter the bodies of humans and animals via inhalation, ingestion, or wound contamination.

Identifying Depleted Uranium Contamination

The uranium oxide dust created by the impact of a DU round into a target or the oxidation of a DU round in a fire is usually a dull black, though it may also appear blackish-gold or blackish- green. This uranium dust may be found at the point of impact, on the surface of an impacted vehicle and the surrounding ground area, and within the impacted vehicle. The highest levels of contamination are usually within an impacted vehicle. Depleted uranium dust has a distinctive detectable radioactive signature which can be measured with a radiacmeter.

Depleted uranium impacts are also often characterized by a small, round entry hole surrounded by spalling if the metal is hard, or fin lines if the metal is soft. If the penetrator goes through the target without fully breaking up, the exit hole will also be small and round, and slightly larger than the entry hole. The presence of black uranium dust and entry holes in the outside of a vehicle are telltale signs of a DU impact.

Additionally, the impact of a DU penetrator, or penetration of DU armor, may cause metal on the exterior or interior of the impacted vehicle to be melted and re-hardened (spalling). This spalling may contain uranium contamination, and should be checked with a radiacmeter.

In the event that a DU impact causes an explosion, or a shaped-charge high explosive round with a DU liner impacts a vehicle, it may be more difficult to identify depleted uranium contamination in and around the vehicle. Over time, wind and water may remove depleted uranium dust from the surface of a vehicle. Additionally, people who come in contact with contaminated vehicles may remove DU contamination on their skin or clothing. The 1995 Army training manual on DU munitions states that "the only positive way to identify DU contamination is to survey the equipment or individual with radiacmeters."

Depleted uranium projectiles fired in combat will be found in three places:

1. In or near the target vehicles: Most tank rounds will hit the target and remain in or near it.

2. On the soil surface: Projectiles that miss the target will often ricochet off the ground like a stone skipping across water. Small fragments and particles of DU may be visible in the "skip" area. They will usually come to rest within a mile or two of the intended target.

3. Buried under the soil surface: Some projectiles will strike the ground at an angle and bury themselves. The percentage of buried rounds depends on engagement angles and ranges, soil types, and terrain.

The oxidation of the depleted uranium rod or fragment will cause it to appear black. DU contamination may be detected using a radiacmeter in the "skip" areas and the place where the penetrator lands. Levels of soil contamination are higher in "skip" areas than in areas where the penetrators come to rest, but the total mass of DU is usually higher where the penetrator lands.

Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Depleted uranium is a radioactive heavy metal. Prolonged, close contact with depleted uranium armor or ammunition could cause adverse health effects. However, depleted uranium has the greatest potential to cause health problems when DU fragments or dust particles enter the body.

Depleted uranium's chemical toxicity presents the greatest danger to health in the short term after exposure, but DU's radioactivity may cause severe health problems years or decades after exposure.

We have already noted that between 2 and 7 pounds of uranium dust will be created during the impact of one depleted uranium penetrator into a target. Army test data has shown that 50 to 96% of the uranium aerosols formed by an impact is of respirable size, and 17 to 48% of the respirable particles are soluble in lung fluid. Soluble uranium compounds easily travel in the bloodstream and are more readily excreted from the body than insoluble uranium compounds. Army test data has also shown depleted uranium penetrators will "slow cook" and could completely oxidize into powder in fires. The solubility of the uranium compounds formed during a fire is determined by the temperature of the fire and other factors. The average size of the depleted uranium dust formed by a fire is 0.04 inch in diameter, slightly larger than respirable size.

Depleted uranium may be internalized as a result of breathing smoke or contaminated air containing DU aerosols, hand-to-mouth transfer as a result of contact with contaminated equipment or soil, inhalation or ingestion of resuspended particles, ingestion of food or water contaminated by DU, or contamination of wounds by DU dust. The experience of Operation Desert Storm also shows that people may be wounded by depleted uranium fragments, which, depending on their location in the body, may be difficult to remove.

Ingestion of large amounts of depleted uranium dust may cause short-term health problems including nausea, vomiting, weakness, and diarrhea. Depleted uranium fragments or particles in the body may cause severe health problems years or decades after exposure, including: kidney and liver damage; a depressed immune system; cancers of the lung, bone and other organs; leukemia; tissue decay; anemia; chromosomal damage; reproductive problems; and birth defects. As noted by Army Lt. Col. Eric Daxon, imbedded uranium fragments could also cause neurological damage depending on their location in the body: "the risks of fragments near neural (nerve) tissues should be carefully assessed because of the non-proliferative nature of these cells."

Despite what is known about the health effects of internal uranium exposure, additional studies are need. The release of depleted uranium in combat is a method of exposure which has not been thoroughly studied, and may cause unforeseen health problems.

The July, 1990 Science Applications International Corporation report, Kinetic Energy Penetrator Environmental and Health Considerations, notes that the full range of health effects of uranium in the body "may be impossible to reliably quantify even with additional detailed studies."

In August, 1996, Dr. George Voelz, a guest scientist in the Epidemiology Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory, explained the pathways of ingested uranium particles in the body to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses:

[Soluble] uranium which is absorbed in the blood circulation within the body is eliminated rapidly through the kidney in urine. 60 to 70 percent is excreted through the kidney in the first day. About 20 percent is deposited initially in the bone, which is the principal storage site in the body. The rest, about 10 percent, is distributed to other organs, especially the liver . . . There is no known chemical toxicity from uranium remaining in the bone. The risk to bones, such as bone cancer, is related to the radiation dose . . . The critical organ after an uptake of toxic levels of soluble uranium is the kidney. The resultant kidney damage has been extensively studied in animals. The injury is caused by chemical damage to the kidney cells and especially tubular cells.

Ongoing research by the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute has found that depleted uranium in the blood stream of rats deposits in the kidney, bone, brain, muscle, and spleen.

As mentioned by Dr. Voelz, the kidney is understood to be the organ most sensitive to uranium's chemical toxicity. Of concern for veterans and others exposed to depleted uranium is the Army Environmental Policy Institute's observation that "standard tests for kidney toxicity might not detect early signs of kidney damage caused by DU internalization. Therefore, more sensitive kidney function tests may be required to adequately evaluate the impact of this type of combat injury." The July, 1990 Science Applications International Corporation report also notes that "workers who have previously been exposed to uranium may be at greater risk in the event of subsequent kidney disease than unexposed workers, since it has been observed that a loss of up to 75% of kidney function can be clinically undetected." Also of concern is SAIC's belief that "attending physicians would not likely suspect, or report, uranium involvement" in kidney problems.

Dr. Voelz succinctly described the effects of inhaled depleted uranium particles to the Presidential Advisory Committee:

Behavior of inhaled uranium particles is dependent on the solubility of the particular uranium compound in body fluids. If the compound is soluble, uranium will be absorbed into the blood and will follow the pathways just described [p. 19]. If the particles are highly insoluble, some percent of them will remain in the lung for months or years. Chemical toxicity due to uranium in the lung or from pulmonary lymph nodes has not been identified. The radiation dose to the lung determines the risk of induction of lung cancer.

Depleted uranium's radioactivity is considered to be `low- level' when compared to the `high level' radioactivity of enriched uranium. `High level' radioactivity released by nuclear weapons and other sources is dangerous because high-energy gamma rays can penetrate the body and quickly cause significant damage or death. However, depleted uranium's radioactivity is considered `low-level' because it is primarily an alpha particle emitter. The energy of an alpha particle is extremely high but only travels a short distance, making it the most dangerous form of radiation inside the body.

The 1995 US Army Chemical School DU training manual describes the nature of radioactivity:

Radioactivity is the spontaneous emission (spitting out) of particles or energy (ionizing radiation) from an unstable atom resulting in the formation of a new element. Ionizing radiation consists of alpha particles, beta particles, and gamma rays. The health effects of ionizing radiation depend on what type of radiation it is and if the radioactive material is inside or outside the body . . . Alpha radiation is the most ionizing [per unit track]. When the alpha particle gets inside the body, the internal tissues absorb the energy causing mass destruction of the cells near the particle. In contrast, beta and gamma are more penetrating but do not cause as many ionizations [per unit track] resulting in less damage within the body. Depleted uranium is primarily an alpha particle (emitter) although beta particles and gamma rays are also emitted from radioactive decay products.

Radiation of body tissues and organs may cause cancer or other health effects years or decades after initial exposure.

The Army Environmental Policy Institute report states that "the radiation dose to critical body organs depends upon the amount of time that DU resides in the organs.

When this value is known or estimated, cancer and hereditary risk estimates can be determined." The Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses noted in its Final Report that "Since uranium is potential carcinogen, it is possible that exposure to DU during the Gulf War could lead to a slight increase in the risk for lung cancer after decades following the war."

Internalized depleted uranium may also cause reproductive problems and chromosomal damage in exposed persons. A chromosome is a structure in the nucleus of a cell containing DNA, which transmits genetic information. Damage to the chromosomes could affect genetic structure and cause birth defects or developmental disabilities in the children of men and women exposed to depleted uranium. The VA's Depleted Uranium Program has recently started analyzing the sperm of Gulf War veterans for the presence of depleted uranium and chromosomal damage.

Dr. Melissa McDiarmid, the current director of the VA's Depleted Uranium Program, has pointed to studies which raise concerns about the potential role of uranium in reproductive problems and birth defects:

The majority of studies have shown no histologic damage to gonads in animal tox work but some testicular damage in rats with increased amounts of [uranium] oxides in diet. You can see a very old study . . . [that] found cleft palate and sternal abnormalities in mice and embryo lethality. Another paper more recently . . . demonstrated both cytotoxicity [toxicity to cells] and genotoxicity [toxicity to chromosomes] in Chinese hamster ovary cells.

Dr. McDiarmid believes the potential for chromosomal damage is due to uranium's chemical toxicity, not its radioactivity.

Dr. McDiarmid also reports that studies of humans link depleted uranium exposures to chromosomal damage:

There [were] two different groups of uranium workers. One, fuel production plant workers that had exposure to both soluble and insoluble uranium . . . [and] Group B, who were fuel enrichment workers exposed to uranium fluoride, which is much more soluble. They looked at blood lymphocyte cultures for both chromosomal aberrations and sister chromatid exchange, SCE, which is a measure of point mutation. They found frequencies of dicentric total chromosomal aberrations were significantly higher in group B . . . They also looked at frequency of sister chromatid exchange.

These were increased in both groups of uranium workers, those exposed to both the mixed types of solubility and the soluble uranium. However, group B, those exposed to the soluble uranium, had much higher frequencies . . .they assumed that the effects were chemically derived, possibly, they said, through a phosphate group binding of DNA.

It is encouraging to note that Dr. McDiarmid has stated that 17 healthy babies have been born to the veterans being monitored in the DU Program. Therefore, she believes this is an indication that reproductive effects (e.g. sterility) are of greater concern than developmental effects (birth defects) for veterans exposed to depleted uranium. However, studies on animals and humans exposed to depleted uranium have documented the potential for both reproductive and developmental effects. The need for additional research on the relationship between depleted uranium exposure and reproductive and developmental effects was noted by Dr. Reeves at the November, 1997 meeting of the VA's Expert Scientific Advisory Committee:

The actual endpoints that I would be more interested in from a VA point of view, it soundslike kidney damage long term, possible genotoxic effects, birth defects long term, and both of those, I would think, would require essentially new legislation to deal with, wouldn't they? The VA cannot deal with birth defects. If birth defects are in fact part of breathing in uranium, having nothing to do with radioactivity, but uranium itself, to even do this study and look at this is going to be a long way down the pike. We have to talk about new legislation; we have to talk about new types of studies.

Any future studies depleted uranium should separately examine the effects of DU on women and men. Additionally, these studies should be conducted by an organization with no ties to the Department of Defense. Currently, the Depleted Uranium Program is only conducting research on the effects of DU on men who were exposed in friendly fire incidents. However, many women were also exposed to depleted uranium in the Persian Gulf War, and women are increasingly becoming directly involved in combat operations. Of concern for women veterans, and the spouses of veterans who may have returned home with personal items and souvenirs contaminated with depleted uranium, are studies which have found that in experimental animals, uranium was recovered from the placenta, fetus, and milk of females and from the tissues and urine of offspring fed milk from exposed females. The Army Environmental Policy Institute report adds that "effects ranged from low birth weight to skeletal abnormalities for doses at which the mother exhibited signs of chemical toxicity."

Dr. Rosalie Bertell, President of the International Institute of Concern for Public Health in Toronto, Canada, has studied the effects of uranium and other bone-seeking radionuclides in several populations. Dr. Bertell reports statistically significant monocyte (white blood cell) depression in four populations that she studied. Dr. Bertell states that radiation from a source such as depleted uranium affects the development of monocytes in the bone, resulting in iron deficient anemia and a impaired cellular immune system in exposed populations.

One exposed population studied by Dr. Bertell was the Mississauga First Nation (Indigenous People's tribe), who were exposed to uranium dust from a June, 1990 accident at the CAMECO uranium refinery near the north shore of Lake Huron, in Canada.

Dr. Bertell states that the monocyte counts were depressed for all age groups within the first six months. Dr. Bertell also reports that a regime of distilled water -- thought to leach inorganic heavy metals like depleted uranium from the body -- may have helped return children's monocyte counts to normal levels.

At this point in time, it is difficult to definitively determine the extent to which Gulf War veterans were exposed to depleted uranium. The fact that the body naturally purges most of the inhaled or ingested uranium shortly after exposure, combined with the inadequacy of whole body count and urine tests for depleted uranium to determine an exposure 7 years ago, further complicates analysis of the potential for cancers and reproductive problems in veterans and their families, and developmental defects in veterans' children. The utility of 24-hour urine tests to screen for DU exposure is questionable considering that by 1995, the veterans in the DU Program who did not retain depleted uranium fragments were no longer showing elevated signs of DU in their urine.

As noted by Dr. Voelz of Los Alamos National Laboratory, the body will naturally excrete most of the inhaled or ingested soluble uranium particles in urine and feces within several weeks of exposure. For this reason, nasal swipes and 24-hour urine tests are supposed to be taken from a contaminated person as soon as possible after exposure. The AEPI report notes that "measuring the quantity of DU a soldier internalized, as soon as practical after initial exposure, would improve the Army's ability to subsequently determine the significance of the exposure." It is therefore unlikely that 24-hour urine tests administered months, or even years, after a person's exposure to DU dust would show the presence of elevated levels of depleted uranium. However, as noted by Dr. Bertell, an analysis of monocyte levels in the blood may be an indicator of the presence of depleted uranium in the bone.

Depleted uranium's radioactivity also poses an external radiation hazard if spent DU penetrators are collected and kept close to the body. Depleted uranium fragments and intact rounds (without shielding) deliver a skin dose of approximately 200mrem/hour (beta). As a point of comparison, the recommended maximum permissible radiation exposure to a person's skin is 0.06mrem/hour (beta). Therefore, a person holding a spent DU penetrator would receive a radiation dose 3,333 times greater than the recommended maximum exposure level. Though depleted uranium is not as highly radioactive as enriched uranium, it still presents a significant radiation hazard, especially when exposure to DU metal without shielding occurs at close range.

In addition, prolonged exposure to intact depleted uranium armor or penetrators could result in a higher-than-normal external radiation exposure. The driver in a tank with depleted uranium armor, or a person working around DU ammunition stockpiles, may be particularly at risk from the external radiation of depleted uranium, even though minimal shielding may be present. Visible signs of excess external radiation exposure include skin burns and radiation sickness.

Storm Warnings

The hazards of depleted uranium munitions were well documented by the US Army long before depleted uranium penetrators and tank armor were used for the first time in warfare during Operation Desert Storm. For reasons that have not been adequately explained by the US Department of Defense and the UK Ministry of Defense, no effort was made prior to the start of the war to inform US or coalition forces in the Persian Gulf region about the use of depleted uranium munitions, methods to identify depleted uranium contamination, procedures to treat soldiers contaminated by depleted uranium, or safety measures which could minimize or prevent an individual's exposure to DU contamination. As a result, tens of thousands of military personnel and civilians may have been exposed to depleted uranium on Persian Gulf War battlefields.

*****

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, numerous Army reports predicted the potential for widespread exposures to depleted uranium if DU penetrators were used in combat. The first major study to assess the health and environmental impacts of depleted uranium munitions was the April, 1974 report, Medical and Environmental Evaluation of Depleted Uranium.

This report was completed by a group of Army, Navy, and Air Force officers comprising the Ad Hoc Working Group for Depleted Uranium of the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME).

The JTCG/ME report was "intended to foresee and be prepared to answer the many questions that may be raised within the DoD, the Public Health Service, Congress, and the public with regard to DU use in munitions."

This document provided rationales for the use of depleted uranium in munitions which continue to be invoked by Pentagon officials today. The report's conclusion contradicts itself: "Overall, implementation of the proposed action is expected to have no significant medical and environmental impact. Depending on conditions locally, significant impact can occur in the event of uncontrolled release of DU." In a roundabout way, the JTCG/ME report acknowledges that the use of DU in combat -- resulting in the uncontrolled release of depleted uranium -- could have significant impacts on human health and the environment. Yet this report, like many other Army reports on depleted uranium, approved of the use of depleted uranium in munitions.

In 1974, seventeen years before Operation Desert Storm, the JTCG/ME report prudently noted that "adherence to safety procedures and use of protective clothing minimize the potential for human exposure" to depleted uranium. The report acknowledges the dangers of using depleted uranium in munitions, yet it optimistically pretends that safety procedures can or will be followed by in combat. In a twist of logic still repeated by Pentagon officials today, the April, 1974 report stated:

In combat situations involving the widespread use of DU munitions, the potential for inhalation, ingestion, or implantation of DU compounds may be locally significant. However, it should be noted that problems from the use of DU on the battlefield or at sea are insignificant when compared to other dangers of combat.

On the battlefield, the immediate risks of combat are clearly of greater concern than the cancers, kidney problems, reproductive effects or other health problems that may not develop until years after a soldier's exposure. However, the potential health and environmental impacts of depleted uranium munitions, as well as the need for safety procedures and protective clothing, was clearly foreseen in 1974, a group of Army, Navy, and Air Force officers.

After the 1974 report rubber stamped the Department of Defense's plans for using depleted uranium in armor-piercing penetrators, research, development, testing and evaluation of DU munitions expanded rapidly.

Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, the US Army purchased large amounts of depleted uranium penetrators and tested them on open-air ranges throughout the United States. By July, 1990, both the effectiveness and the hazards of depleted uranium penetrators were well documented by the US Army.

On July 24, 1990 -- nine days before Iraq invaded Kuwait -- the US Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) released a comprehensive report comparing depleted uranium and tungsten kinetic energy penetrators. Attached as Appendix D of this report was the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) report, Kinetic Energy Penetrator Environmental and Health Considerations. The SAIC report, completed in July, 1990, warned:

Aerosol DU exposures to soldiers on the battlefield could be significant with potential radiological and toxicological effects. These health impacts may be impossible to reliably quantify even with additional detailed studies. It is not our intention to overstate this issue given other combat risks, nor to imply that the health of soldiers will definitely be compromised. We are simply highlighting the potential for levels of exposure to military personnel during combat that would be unacceptable during peacetime conditions.

The SAIC further noted: "Under combat conditions, the MEI's [most exposed individuals] are probably the ground troops that re-enter a battlefield following the exchange of armor-piercing munitions, either on foot or on motorized transports." SAIC also stated "assuming US regulatory standards and health physics practices are followed, it is likely that some form of remedial action will be required in a DU post-combat environment." Nine days after this report was released by the US Army, Iraqi armed forces invaded Kuwait. Within days US troops began deploying to Saudi Arabia with large amounts of depleted uranium penetrators. In December, 1990, the first US M1A1 tanks with depleted uranium armor were delivered to units in Saudi Arabia.



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